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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

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April 19, 1984

Dear Bill:

I know that you see the US-Soviet relationship as a long-term struggle. Some of our most important allies in that struggle ultimately may prove to be the various peoples of the Soviet Union. For that reason, this Administration's basic policy document on the Soviet Union (NSDD-75) set out as a major objective encouraging the internal liberation of that society and penetrating the controls set up by the system.

We have limited means to pursue this process.

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I have in mind such programs as the dissemination of books and other publications within the Soviet empire, letters by Soviet emigres to their contacts in the Soviet Union, and active support for underground Solidarity in Poland.

It is sometimes difficult to measure results in our penetration efforts, to know precisely what materials get through. But at a time when the KGB has managed temporarily to stifle most organized dissent inside the USSR, keeping the struggle going outside is even more significant as it preserves hope.

Similar programs directed at Eastern Europe are also important. Poland is only the latest demonstration of the fundamental instability of these systems, of the strong desire of Eastern Europeans for the lifestyles and basic freedoms of the West. Also, dissent in Eastern Europe has some spill-over influence inside the Soviet Union.

The Honorable
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

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